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Europe and the Arab World: Towards a Principled Partnership
Past Trends…
For decades, EU policies in the Middle East and
North Africa have been predicated on upholding the
political status quo in the name of “regional stabili-
ty”. Given Europe’s close geographic proximity and
multiple linkages with the region, a stable regional
environment was considered to be of vital impor-
tance in order to build energy and trade links, con-
trol immigration, and prevent the spread of terrorist
networks. Alarmed by the experience of the Algerian
civil war and humbled by a history of colonial medd-
ling, EU leaders accepted that only the region’s
autocratic rulers could deliver
on these issues. Change, it was
widely believed, would have to
come gradually and needed to
be carefully supervised in order
to prevent the region from slip-
ping into chaos.
As a result, EU policies stayed well clear of promo-
ting bottom-up change in the region. Instead, they
sought to encourage top-down reforms that had the
potential of fostering a gradual political and econo-
mic transition. To this end, the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) offered a number of
bilateral financial and political incentives. To those
willing to go further, the EU offered so-called
Advanced Status. Both relied on interdependence
and positive rewards rather than negative condi-
tionality to affect a change in regime behavior. The
creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
further undermined the EU’s ability to foster politi-
cal reforms by turning its policies into a “shared
responsibility” and prioritizing economic and busi-
ness ties.
The recent wave of pro-democracy protests and the
toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes have
demonstrated the deep flaws of this half-hearted
approach. Irrespective of the outcome of the current
revolutionary wave, it is clear that these upheavals
represent a dilemma for existing EU polices on
several levels.
…and Future Challenges
Stability Dilemma: The overthrow of the Tunisian
and Egyptian regimes has paid heed to the EU’s
assumption that regional stability could be had on
the cheap. The events also put
into question the EU’s more
general foreign policy strategy
that by fostering interdepen-
dence and dialogue the EU is
able to encourage domestic
reforms. But Libya’s descent into chaos also con-
firms the potential risks involved in a political tran-
sition. This places an old dilemma into new light:
While the EU needs to support budding democra-
cies in Tunisia and Egypt, what about laggards like
Syria or Saudi Arabia?
Economic Dilemma: The EU has for long has fos-
tered market reforms and privatization in the MENA
countries. While generating economic growth, these
reforms have also contributed to the stark economic
inequalities in the region. “Neo-liberalism” as an
economic strategy has been tarnished as a result.
But any backtracking on reforms is likely to damage
the economic prospects for the region. This means
that the EU will have to carefully review its current
focus on market-driven reforms and their potential
impact.
"The overthrow of the Tunisian and
Egyptian regimes has paid heed to
the EU's assumption that regional
stability could be had on the cheap."
The recent wave of mass protests sweeping the Arab world has caught the EU by surprise. In a bid to adapt its
policies to a rapidly changing situation and regain some credibility, the European Commission has launched a
proposal for a “partnership for democracy and shared prosperity”. This partnership, however, represents little
more than a re-branding of existing EU policies. In order to open a new chapter in its relations with the Arab
world, the EU will need to learn from its past mistakes and adopt a more humble approach that is based on the
emerging political realities of the region.
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Islamist Dilemma: The Tunisian and Egyptian
examples have disproved the widely-held believe
that the only alternative to autocratic Arab rulers are
radical Islamist governments. Yet again, they have
also shown that Political Islam is not a monolithic
phenomenon. With Egypt’s Muslim Brothers and
Tunisia’s al-Nahda now able to join the political pro-
cess, the EU will have little choice but to revise its
policy of non-engagement with these groups. But if
the EU starts engaging with Islamists in Egypt and
Tunisia, its policy of isolating Hamas and “picking
winners”will become ever more contradictory.
Institutional Dilemma: During
the past few months European
policies have found themselves
in a complete log-jam due to
the enduring blockage of the UfM. Arab democra-
cies are going to be even less likely to cooperate with
Israel. New divisions might also emerge within the
Arab camp. The revival of Pan-Arab solidarity and
the emphasis protesters placed on national dignity
might further undermine support for Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation. Finding a new institu-
tional formula in this atmosphere, especially given
the EU’s credibility deficit, might well be a challeng-
ing task.
Towards A New Beginning?
Caught off-guard, the EU’s initial reaction to the
Arab uprising has been a mixture of confusion and
bewilderment. While the EU recovered its compo-
sure following the ousting of Ben Ali and Mubarak
and has adopted a more principled position on
Libya, it continues to suffer from a lack of cohesion
as different countries jockey to reassert their nation-
al interests in the region. But as the initial confusion
died down, a broad consensus emerged that a fun-
damental repositioning of EU policies had become
unavoidable.
In its recent communication on a “Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity” the EU
Commission outlined its plans for a radical re-start
of Euro-Mediterranean relations. During the
European Council Meeting of 11 March 2011, EU
Heads of States welcomed the Commission commu-
nication and pledged to “support all steps towards
democratic transformation, political systems that
allow for peaceful change, growth and prosperity,
and a more proportionate distribution of the bene-
fits of economic performance.”
To make good on these promises, the Commission
proposes a shift towards greater differentiation and
conditionality by reallocating financial support
according to the principle of “more-for-more”: more
EU assistance for more political and economic
reforms. Aside from reallocating 4 billion of ENPI
funding earmarked for the southern Mediterranean,
the European Council promised to examine the pos-
sibility of boosting EIB lending to the region by 
1 billion over the same time horizon. Discussions are
also under way about 1 billion annually of extra fun-
ding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). Other
political incentives raised by
the Commission include mobi-
lity partnerships, greater
access to EU markets in agri-
culture and services, a new civil society facility and
enhanced political dialogue.
The idea is that this new incentive-based approach
is going to be centered on a number of clear bench-
marks against which all partner countries will be
assessed with participation open to all Medi-
terranean countries that are committed to “adequa-
tely monitored, free and fair elections.”Their willing-
ness to cooperate with the EU when it comes to
immigration and foreign policy will also be assessed.
The concrete role of the UfM in these plans remains
unclear, except for the rather vague aspirations that
it should allow for a greater use of variable geometry
and provide a bigger role for the EU Commission.
These measures are promising. But they are hardly
new. The idea of encouraging reforms through
incentives has been an idée fixe of the ENP. Nor is
the idea of encouraging greater differentiation in
Euro-Mediterranean affairs a novelty. More innova-
tive is the re-introduction of positive conditionality
through the “more-for-more” principle. But here
much will depend on implementation. In the past,
the EU’s financial allocations have more often been
driven by national expediency than an objective
assessment of reform achievements. Whether this
will change under the new partnership and funding
might be diverted from Algeria to Egypt or from
Palestine to Tunisia, remains to be seen.
However, even if the EU manages to impose a more
stringent conditionality, it is not clear that the new
incentives will be juicy enough to tempt reluctant
reformers. As Martin Schulz, the leader of the EP’s
S&D group rightly pointed out, to be comparable to
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uprising has been a mixture of con-
fusion and bewilderment."
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the US’s post-war effort, a European “Marshall Plan
for the Mediterranean” would require 1% of
European GDP; far more than is being offered.
Moreover, many of the political incentives raised by
the Commission, such as mobility pacts or access to
agricultural markets, are not particular new. What is
worse, they require the approval of the always reluc-
tant member states. Whether they will be more
forthcoming on these issues, given the current poli-
tical and economic climate in Europe, seems far
from assured.
Learning from Past Mistakes
Instead of a real paradigm shift, the Commission’s
proposals therefore represent a re-branding of pre-
vious policies. This is not neces-
sarily a problem. Many of these
policies were sensible. Offering
a few more resources and
incentives in accordance with
the principle of “more-for-more” is laudable and
long overdue. But this is not enough. To open a new
chapter in its relations the EU will have to learn
from its past mistakes.
To start with, the EU will have to become much
more coherent in its approach. At the moment, the
EU mixes bureaucratic criteria and political goals
when determining the level of its support to Middle
Eastern countries. This makes its policies appear
incoherent. If it is serious about supporting a politi-
cal transition, it will have to allocate a sizeable
chunk of its neighborhood funding in accordance
with clear democracy criteria. With no extra funding
available, this will inevitably mean a reallocation of
funding away from reform laggards. To appear cre-
dible, it will also have to abstain from the temptation
of curry-favoring with these by
using the UfM as an alterna-
tives channel of assistance.
The EU will also have to stop
trying to pick winners in its
neighborhood. Nothing has
been as damaging to the EU’s
reputation than sidelining
Hamas after the 2006 Pales-
tinian elections. While there
might have been good reasons
for that at the time, any repeat
would spell a swift end to its
budding “partnership for
democracy”. This might imply working with govern-
ments that do not share the EU’s social and econo-
mic agenda, as long as they support free and fair
elections. The EU will also have to scrap its policy of
non-engagement with Islamist parties and other
civil society actors that want to be part of this pro-
cess. Given the EU’s reduced influence, anything
else is likely to be futile.
The EU also needs to avoid creating false expecta-
tions amongst its neighbors. Time and again, the EU
has dispensed promises that it has been unable to
fulfill. By hastily throwing out a new set of promises
and setting artificial deadlines – such as that for a
community of democracies by 2020 – the EU will do
little to restore its reputation in the region. This is
especially true when the EU is
not willing to make the re-
quired investments to ensure
such an outcome. Assurances
for an increase in resources,
visa facilitation, or easier trade access should not be
given unless the Commission is certain that it can
deliver. The EU’s increasingly difficult relationship
with Turkey stands testimony to the fact that unkept
promises come with a price attached.
Finally, the EU should use the opportunity to break
with its outdated focus on a Euro-Mediterranean
community. The Mediterranean never provided an
ideal frame for EU policies. This has once again been
demonstrated by the course of current events. The
recent upheavals have been Pan-Arab in their nature
and will reshape the policies of the region accor-
dingly. The EU should acknowledge this fact and
refocus its policies in line with these developments.
This means opening its new partnership to the
wider Arab world and supporting more whole-hear-
tedly Pan-Arab cooperation. But
it also means acknowledging
that the Mediterranean is more
than “Europe’s backyard”.
While these steps will not solve
all of the EU’s problems in the
Arab world, they might help it
regain some badly needed trust
and credibility across the region.
A hasty, if well-meant, re-packa-
ging of old ideas under a new
heading risks doing the opposite.
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present a re-branding of previous 
policies."
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